We consider uplink power control in wireless communication when massive users compete over the channel resources. The CDMA protocol, as a supporting technology of 3G networks accommodating signal from different sources over the code domain, represents the orthogonal multiple access techniques. With the development of 5G wireless networks, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is introduced to improve the efficiency of channel allocation. Our goal is to investigate whether the power-domain NOMA protocol can introduce a natural fair principle when the users interact with each other in a non-cooperative manner. It is compared with the CDMA protocol, where the fierce competition among users jeopardizes the efficiency of channel usage. The whole work is split into two parts. In this paper, (i.e., Part I), we conduct analysis with a mean-field game (MFG) model, and show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium strategy. To determine whether NOMA is a more efficient communication protocol for uplink communication, the social welfare comparison is conducted in Part II [1].
I. INTRODUCTION
Power allocation has been conducted in wireless communications, wireless sensor networks as well as networked control systems. As a variant of resource allocation, it mainly deals with the tradeoff between the performance achieved and the power consumption. Moreover, recent advances in the fifthgeneration (5G) communication network [2] have led to a resurgence of interest in transmission power control.
Earlier works in wireless communications optimize the performance through appropriate energy allocation. Decentralized approaches are frequently investigated, among which game-theoretic methods are powerful tools for modeling noncooperative channel access behaviors, especially for uplink users. Alpcan et al. [3] and Huang et al. [4] considered a channel access game where each user strives for a better quality of service (QoS), and mechanism design is employed to improve the social effect. Moreover, centralized power allocation for maximizing the sum data rate is considered by Fischione et al. [5] . Later on, to accommodate multiple users in uplink transmission more efficiently with successive interference cancellation, optimal power allocation for uplink and downlink communication has been investigated by Xu et al. [6] and Zhu et al. [7] , respectively.
In a networked control system, it is also of interest to allocate the power appropriately to enhance the performance of state estimation or control performance. Earlier works by Quevedo et al. [8] and Wu et al. [9] considered transmission power control for remote state estimation. Moreover, a joint design of power schedule and remote state estimate of a dynamic system over a fading channel has been addressed by Ren et al. [10] . On the other hand, power control in the feedback loop of a networked control system has been studied by Gatsis et al. [11] , [12] , where the power scheduling over the wireless channel for transmission of the control signal is investigated for single and multiple control loops.
Recent studies address transmission power allocation for a large number of users in a mean-field game setup. Huang et al. [13] , [14] investigated uplink power control of massive players with a mean-field model. Moreover, Semasinghe and Hossain [15] dealt with downlink power allocation and compared the mean-field equilibrium performance under different utility functions. Some recent works generalize the analysis of mean-field games to large-scale LQG problems. Huang et al. [16] considered a mean-field game with a major player. Later, Huang and Zhou [17] builds the connection between the asymptotic solvability and the fixed-point approach for solving mean-field LQG games.
Motivated by the advances of the 5G communication network, several recent works [7] , [18] , [19] investigated the optimal power allocation problem with non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) employed among users sharing the same portion of the physical resource. The receivers under the NOMA protocol adopt successive interference cancellation (SIC), which improves the chance of successful decoding at the receiver. According to Vaezi et al. [20] , development of the computational capability of user equipment has enabled the deployments of NOMA for practical applications.
Following the direction of Xu and Cumanan [21] as well as Wei et al. [22] , this work discusses the social welfare comparison of uplink channel access between the conventional orthogonal multiple access schemes and NOMA. We adopt a static decision model and perform qualitative analyses. As 5G communication features massive connectivity and the meanfield formulation has not yet investigated for NOMA, our work is motivated to find an appropriate model for characterizing the massive behavior under power-domain NOMA, which regulates the transmission power contests among the noncooperative uplink users as a natural fair principle, in contrast to the fierce contest introduced by CDMA.
Challenges arise while modeling the massive behaviors under the NOMA protocol:
(1) The uplink users are heterogeneous as the value of channel gain at each user varies, hence it is difficult to characterize individual behaviors in presence of a large population;
(2) The specific channel fading model for uplink users is not always available since the physical environment where the users are located is in general challenging to describe. Thus, it is desirable to have general results not depending on the specific form of channel distribution; (3) The social welfare comparison between two communication protocols is in general challenging in a noncooperative setup, as the changes of the equilibrium strategies under different protocols are difficult to track.
We will address these challenges through appropriate modeling and transformation of problems. The contributions of this paper are three-fold:
(1) We model the interactions among massive heterogeneous players under CDMA and NOMA as a mean-field game, in which we label each player with its type variable (i.e., the uplink channel gain), and the opponents' action is modelled as a collective effect (i.e., the interference). The equilibria under CDMA and NOMA are characterized in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. To the best of our knowledge, such a mean-field game framework for NOMA is new; (2) The results we have obtained do not depend on the specific channel fading model, i.e., the distribution of the channel gain, hence can be applied to a wide range of physical environments; (3) The equilibrium social welfare comparison for noncooperative interactions under CDMA and NOMA has been formalized as the comparison between the optima of different optimization problems, which is detailed in the Part II [1] .
The general problem formulation as well as the characterization of the equilibrium strategy is presented in Part I of this paper, while the social welfare comparison results are given in Part II [1] .
The remainder of Part I is organized as follows. In Section II, the preliminaries on wireless communications with uplink channel users are introduced. To effectively model the transmission power game among a large number of channel users, we formulate their interactions as a mean-field game in Section III. Section IV and Section V characterize the equilibrium strategies under CDMA and NOMA protocols, respectively. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude Part I.
Notations:
We denote the set of non-negative numbers as R + and the set of positive numbers as R ++ . The set of non-negative integers is denoted as N + . The standard unit vector in the direction of the i-th dimension is denoted as e i = (0, 0, . . . , 1 i−th , . . . , 0) ∈ R N . For any Lebesgue measurable set A ⊂ R, denote its Lebesgue measure as λ(A). And the abbreviation "a.e." is adopted for "almost everywhere". And for any l ≤ u, we define a truncation operator as [x] u l := min{u, max{l, x}} for any x ∈ R. The modulus of a complex number z = x + iy ∈ C is z := x 2 + y 2 , where x, y ∈ R.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON UPLINK WIRELESS

COMMUNICATION
In this paper, we consider a problem that emerges in wireless networks where multiple signal sources are clients of a single wireless communication channel. Since each client in this wireless network is self-interested, they are involved in competitions when exploiting the wireless channel resources. Different protocols are considered at the physical layer (PHY) of the communication channel, and the received signals are decoded by the base station. The realized data rate, i.e., the maximum rate of reliable communication supported by this channel, is the performance metric. The block diagram of the problem is presented in Fig. 1, and 
Wireless Channel
A. Data sources
There are N independent data sources, they are selfish users of the wireless channel. The information provided by each data source is modelled as a continuous-time waveform x i (t) (t ∈ R + ), where i ∈ N := {1, 2, . . . , N }. Assume that each of the signal source x i (t) has a unit average power level throughout the time horizon, i.e., lim
2 ]dt = 1 holds for any i ∈ N . This is for notational convenience in describing the power level of the transmitted signal at the antennas. Without loss of generality, we assume that each of the original continuous-time signal has a bandwidth bounded by B, which is considered as a physical limitation of the communication channel. Based on Nyquist sampling theorem, we can always find a common sampling period ∆t for all the data sources such that the inequality 1 ∆t > 2B holds, and the sampled signal under this sampling rate carries full information of the original signal sources. For transmission through digital devices, a sampled version x i [k] (k ∈ N + ) of the original signal x i (t) (t ∈ R + ) is generated. Hence, we obtain the discrete-time signal sources x i [k] := x i (k · ∆t) for each i ∈ N . Since each signal source contains different amount of information, they feature different data rates. We denote the data rate of source i as R i bits/s (R i > 0).
B. Gaussian channel and transmission antennas
The communication channel between the data sources and the base station can be modelled as an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel as follows
is a complex Gaussian white noise process, while y[k] is the aggregate received signal at the base station. In addition, we assume time-invariant flat-fading character of the channel at each data source, and denote the uplink channel gain for each data source i as a random variable h i ∈ C. The probability density function of the squared magnitude h i
In this paper, we assume that the channel gains h 1 2 , h 2 2 , . . . , h N 2 are i.i.d. random variables, hence their probability density function is simply denoted as f . Intuitively, all the local users are located within the coverage area of a base station, thus they share similar environments. For generality, we do not take a specific form of distribution for the channel gain h i . However, we require the following assumption to hold so that analyses in this paper are feasible. Assumption 1: The squared norm of the channel gain has a positive and finite first-order moment:
This assumption enables the adoption of the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) when evaluating the interference from other transmitters.
Example 1: Rayleigh fading is commonly adopted to characterize the overall fading effect when a large number of reflectors and scatters present in the path, see [23] . The squared magnitude h 2 of the channel gain has the following probability density function
where the parameter σ > 0. Assumption 1 is clearly satisfied in this case.
The channel state information h i is available at the transmitter i (i.e., CSIT). This is easily achieved by sending a pilot signal prior to the transmission stage. At the receiver, the quality of a certain signal source in the received waveform y[k] is characterized by its SINR. To improve the SINR of a signal x i [k] for a higher probability of successful decoding, a possible method is to raise the transmission power level. For this purpose, the antenna at each data source i will choose an appropriate power level a i . Error-free decoding can be realized subject to good SINR condition, see Section II-C.
Through transmitting signal from different sources at different power levels, a novel multiple access strategy is implemented on the Gaussian channel (1). This strategy exploits the power domain within the same physical channel resource, i.e., time, frequency, etc. Different from the conventional orthogonal multiple access protocols such as time-division multiple access (TDMA) and frequency-division multiple access (FDMA), the multiple access over the power domain is an example of non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), one of the supporting technologies in 5G network [24] .
C. Base station
A base station is located at the end of the uplink Gaussian channel, which is capable of sensing the channel gains of all communication links. The received signal from each data source i will be processed independently at the base station. The specific physical model adopted for describing the fundamental limits in signal decoding as well as two different decoding strategies is introduced below.
The data rate of source i is R i > 0. Based on Shannon's theorem, in order to decode the signal from data source i in an error-free manner, it is necessary for the instantaneous channel capacity of this link to exceed the corresponding data rate R i [23] as follows:
Thus, the indicator for the successful decoding of the signal from data source i is defined as
With the model for signal decoding as well as related notations introduced, the distribution for the decoding outcomes γ (i) of the signal from certain data source i relies on the distributions of h i , and is determined by the outage probability
As a result, the probability of a packet arrival can be expressed as
As the users i ∈ N are interested in supporting the success in decoding their source signal at the base station, each of them will attempt to achieve a higher instantaneous channel capacity in order to accommodate its data waveform at the shared wireless medium.
For a Gaussian channel, there are mainly two decoding strategies when multiple signal sources are transmitting through their uplink channels: single user decoding (SUD) in CDMA and multi-packet reception (MPR) in NOMA. More details for the two methods can be found in Zhang and Haenggi [25] . The power allocation for the data sources will differ when different decoding strategies are employed. Now we briefly introduce the ideas of SUD in CDMA and MPR in NOMA. The details of these protocols and the corresponding decoding algorithms at the receiver will be elaborated in Sections IV and V of this paper.
1) Single user decoding (SUD) in CDMA: For multiple data sources, a communication system employing CDMA deals with each communication link separately. While decoding the signal x i [k] from data source i, the signals from all the other sources j = i are considered as interference. One typical application of this decoding strategy is the directsequence code division multiple access (DS-CDMA) system, where multiple users share a single channel. In order to mitigate the interference between different users, they adopt a group of signature sequences {s i } N i=1 such that they have high auto-correlation and low cross-correlation among themselves. Therefore, by selecting appropriate pseudo-noise (PN) sequences, it is possible to significantly reduce the interference of the received signal at the base station. Hence, the SINR of each user can maintain a certain level while being decoded.
Similar to FDMA and TDMA, the CDMA protocol belongs to the category of orthogonal multiple access (OMA), where different users are allocated different portions of the same type of physical resources, such as frequency bands, time slots, code chips, etc. On the other hand, when multiple users can share the same portion of physical resources, the protocol belongs to the category of non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), which is introduced below.
2) Multi-packet reception (MPR) in NOMA: NOMA features resource sharing among different users such that a tradeoff between efficiency of the communication channel and the fairness among users is balanced. Multi-packet reception (MPR) decoding scheme is performed when NOMA is employed at the communication channel. In order to improve spectral efficiency and the user fairness [20] , NOMA is widely adopted in the fifth-generation (5G) communication network. In this paper, we analyse the effectiveness of power-domain NOMA. To facilitate the comparison of the two decoding methods, the same group of signature sequence {s j } N j=1 as in the CDMA case is assigned to each user for implementation of the spread spectrum technique.
In NOMA, one of the key techniques is successive interference cancellation (SIC) [6] , which is a recursive decoding algorithm. While the receiver is decoding the data from different signal sources following a certain order, the SIC algorithm will cancel the successfully decoded signals from the waveform before performing the subsequent decoding procedures, so that the overall probability of successful decoding is improved.
An example of SIC is the network-assisted interference cancellation and the suppression (NAICS) user terminals adopted by 3GPP LTE-A standard [20] . The deployment of SIC at the receivers increases the time and space complexity. Fortunately, as shown by experiments, the complexity induced by adopting NOMA can be well accommodated by the capability of current user equipment [26] , which provided empirical evidence for the feasibility of the implementation of NOMA.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION: A MEAN-FIELD GAME (MFG) MODEL FOR UPLINK POWER CONTROL
Each data source i aims at uploading its local information to the base station, which can be considered as different clients sharing a common computer network attempting to transmit its data to a distant server, such as cloud storage or cloud computing services.
Due to the selfish nature, each data source aims only at improving the chance of successfully decoding its own signal source at the base station while consuming less power.
The channel sharing behavior among these data sources can be modelled in a game-theoretic framework where different data sources are non-cooperative over the channel usage. To reduce the complexity when a large number of players are involved, we adopt the idea of mean-field games (MFG) [27] , where the impact of opponents' actions on each player is modelled as a collective effect. Then, each player is choosing its action as a response to this collective effect. Now, we present the mean-field game (MFG) model in detail.
A. A mean-field game model
In dense networks, a large number of users will attempt to access the Internet through a single access point (AP). When the number of players N tends to infinity, the effect to the overall performance caused by a single player is negligible. Some notations are introduced below to adapt a mean-field game model to massive players, similar to Nekouei et al. [28] .
In this paper, the interactive behaviors among different users when competing over the uplink wireless channel is modelled as a static mean-field game G = (M, A, u), of which each component is elaborated as follows.
1) The set of players M: We adopt symbolic representations for each type of users. With slight abuse of notations, the realization of the random variable h i is denoted as h i ∈ C as well, which is the channel gain of user i. And the identifier of this user is defined as θ i = h i 2 ∈ R + . We define the set of all possible identifiers as M ⊂ R + such that any possible identifiers θ i belong to M . Assumption 2: To avoid triviality and singularity, we assume M = ∅ and 0 / ∈ M . Thus, the set of all possible identifiers is the subset of positive real numbers, i.e., M ⊂ R ++ . Also, a Borel σ-algebra is generated for the set M and is denoted as B(M ).
In practice, if players with different identifiers are involved in a game with massive players, they will take up a certain ratio of presence in the population. We define a probability measure P over the measurable space (M, B(M )) to model the population of players, where the probability measure P is induced by the probability density function f (x) given in Assumption 1. To be specific, we have P :
and P (M ) = 1. Hence, we choose M ⊂ R ++ as the set of players.
Assumption 3: Assume f (x) > 0 for any x ∈ M , i.e., the probability density function f has positive value on the set of all possible identifiers M ⊂ R ++ .
There is no loss of generality to consider f (x) > 0 for x ∈ M . When this assumption is not satisfied, we can revise the set M of players and obtainM = {θ i ∈ M : f (θ i ) > 0} ⊂ M . All the subsequent analyses are performed withM . By definition of the probability measure P , it holds that P (M ) = P (M ) = 1. SinceM ⊂ M , it can be verified thatM also satisfies Assumption 2.
The intuition of this mean-field model is explained in the following remark.
Remark 1: The identifiers of different users can be interpreted as sampled independently from the same distribution f . Then, by the law of large numbers, the empirical distribution of different types of players will converge to a corresponding probability distribution if the number of players N → ∞. Hence, characterizing the ratio of players with different identities with a probability density function f (x) is feasible and theoretically sound.
2) The strategy space A: Now we define the strategy space of all players in the game.
Since the transmission antennas are controlled by analog circuits and the maximum transmission power at each antenna is bounded, we define the feasible set of transmission power levels as a compact and convex set E :
As the number of players approaches infinity in this game formulation, and all the players with the same identifier are considered to be homogeneous, we denote the strategy of all the players in M as a mapping p : M → E such that the action chosen by the player
Before the formal definition of the feasible strategy space of the players in M is given, we introduce a new measure with which the aggregate effect of the players' strategies can be evaluated. For M ⊂ R ++ , a measure space is defined as (M, B(M ), λ) based on the Lebesgue measure λ. We define a new measure ν as follows.
where the weight function w :
Consequently, a new measure space (M, B(M ), ν) is generated, based on which we define the feasible strategy space as the set of functions
where p is a Lebesgue measurable function. We adopt the convention that two functions are identified as the same element of A if they are equal ν-a.e. 3) The utility function u: The utility function of a player with identifier θ i ∈ M is denoted as u(a i , p, θ i ), where it chooses an action a i ∈ E in response to the opponents' joint strategy p ∈ A. Each data source aims at achieving a higher rate of transmission with less energy, hence the utility function of each data source exhibits a tradeoff between the achieved data rate and the energy consumption, which is defined as follows.
where β i > 0 is a constant weight factor representing the unit power cost at player i. As CDMA and NOMA adopt different decoding algorithms, for a fixed strategy profile p ∈ A, the resulting SINR at the receiver's side will have different values under these two protocols.
Assumption 4: The weight factor penalizing the power consumption is identical for each uplink user i ∈ N , i.e., β 1 = β 2 = · · · = β N = β > 0.
We will adopt this common weight factor β for all the users in the following analysis.
Remark 2:
The assumption for identical weight factor β i in the utility function indicates the cost for unit power consumption is the same for every uplink channel user. Intuitively, this adapts to the case where the power budget available to each user is obtained from the same type of power source, e.g., batteries. It should be noted that with the utility function given in its current form (11) , nonidentical factors β i for different type θ i ∈ M of users will not affect the main results as the existence of equilibrium strategies in Part I and the social welfare comparison results in Part II [1] do not depend on the specific weight value β i associated with a certain user type θ i ∈ M , though the monotonicity of the equilibrium strategy under CDMA as indicated by Corollary 1 in Part II [1] may not hold anymore.
4) The information set I: Though the realization of the channel gain h i is only disclosed to the user itself, the probability density function (PDF) f (x) of the user identity θ i = h i 2 in the population is common knowledge. The realized value of the channel gain for each user can be interpreted as sampled independently from this distribution f (x). This knowledge sharing is achieved as the base station collects statistics of the realized channel magnitude θ i = h i 2 , and then informs each participating player of this distribution (e.g., through a quantized version of the PDF). For user θ i ∈ M , the available information set is
where N 0 is the power spectrum density of the Gaussian noise in the channel, and f (θ) is the probability density function of the user identity. Thus, user θ i will choose a power level from E based on the locally available information set I(θ i ). Remark 3: To facilitate the analysis of the collective effects of an infinite number of users, it is also of interest to explain the convergence of the aggregative effects when massive users present. For a group of countable number of players {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . .}, if the power control strategy profile p(·) is fixed, the interference when CDMA is employed can be expressed by a new random variable a i θ i = p(θ i )θ i . Its firstorder moment is finite, i.e.,
hence Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers (SLLN) [29] applies when analyzing the aggregative effects. The applicability of SLLN to NOMA can be justified in a similar manner.
B. Solution concept for a game
Assume all players are rational in the sense that each of them will seek to optimize its own utility function (i.e., selfinterested). In addition, the rationality of the players' behaviors is common knowledge among all players participating in the game G, as illustrated by Gibbons [30] .
With the rationality assumption, each player i will choose a power level from E to optimize its utility based on its own information set. We call it a decision-making process if a player θ i ∈ M predicts the strategies of other players based on the information available and chooses an action in response to the predicted actions.
Different from an optimization problem, in a game-theoretic setup, the decision-making process of each player i is in the form of a "best response" to the action profile of its opponents. Under this decision pattern, it is of interest to find a joint action profile of all players with which they agree. Thus, we proceed to introduce the concept of -Nash equilibrium [31] for a mean-field game with a finite number of players.
Definition 3 ( -Nash equilibrium): A strategy profile p * ∈ A is an -Nash equilibrium of a game among N ∈ N + players, if for the identity θ i ∈ M of all the N players, we have
where > 0. When the number of users N → ∞, the positive number → 0 according to Theorem 5.7 in Nourian et al. [32] . Hence, as the population size tend to infinity, the -Nash equilibrium converges to a mean-field equilibrium defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Mean-field equilibrium): A strategy profile p * ∈ A is a mean-field equilibrium of a game with an infinite number of players if for any θ i ∈ M , we have
For the static mean-field game G, we define the best response of user θ i ∈ M in presence of the opponents' strategy p ∈ A as a set-valued mapping BR :
Therefore, a strategy p * ∈ A is a mean-field equilibrium if and only if for any θ i ∈ M , there is p * (θ i ) ∈ BR(θ i , p * ). Thus, it is a strategy profile p * ∈ A that every user θ i ∈ M agrees with, and has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from. Next, the details are shown below for analyzing the existence and uniqueness of mean-field equilibrium strategies under CDMA and NOMA.
IV. CDMA TRANSMISSION POWER GAME
A. Single user decoding (SUD) in CDMA 1) Descriptions of CDMA protocol and SUD decoding algorithm: As mentioned in the preliminaries, with CDMA communication protocol, each user is allocated a unique signature sequence so that its transmitted signal can be spread over different sub-carriers (i.e., code chips) in order to mitigate the interference between different users.
As mentioned by [33] , [34] , through appropriate selection of signature sequences of length n s , the squared cross-correlation between the signature sequences s k and s j of users k and j (k = j) can be expressed as β k,j = (s k s j ) 2 ≈ 1 ns = α N , which serves as the gain of the interference induced by user k to the received signal from user j. And since each user in CDMA is assigned a distinct signature sequence, the length n s satisfies n s ≥ N , i.e., 0 < α ≤ 1. In practice, as β k,j = 1 ns , it is preferred to have a larger length n s for the signature sequences in order to reduce the cross-correlation between signature sequence assigned to different users, hence eliminate the interference introduced. Therefore, the parameter α is often chosen to satisfy 0 < α 1. The SINR of the signal from data source i is expressed as
for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. The receiver will attempt to decode the signal from each communication link independently. By Shannon's theorem and (3), the outcome of decoding signal from source i is only dependent on SINR i .
2) The utility functions of the mean-field game using SUD:
When we consider an infinite number of users (i.e., N → ∞), if the user θ i ∈ M chooses a i ∈ E as its transmission power, its received SINR among massive users is given as
where the almost sure convergence holds by Assumption 1 and Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers. Then, the utility function of any user θ i ∈ M in the case of CDMA can be expressed as
B. Analysis of the CDMA transmission power equilibrium
Before we attempt to find the best response of player θ i , we first define a projection operator on R according to Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [35] .
Definition 5: For any given closed convex set X ⊂ R, define an orthogonal projection operator P X : R → X such that P X (x) := arg min z∈X |z − x|, ∀x ∈ R.
With the utility function from the user θ i ∈ M defined, for a fixed strategy p ∈ A of the opponents M/{θ i }, we can obtain the optimal action a * i ∈ E of the player θ i based on the best response operator in (15) ,
As the utility function u(a i , p, θ i ) of the player with fixed identifier θ i and fixed opponents' strategy p is strictly concave with respect to the power control action a i ∈ E, there is a unique maximizer a * i of the utility function, as indicated in Theorem 9.17 in Sundaram [36] . Accordingly, the set of the best response of any player α i ∈ M is a singleton.
Then, the space of all strategy profiles that induced a bounded interference term αE[p(θ j )θ j ] under the CDMA protocol is a vector space defined as
Remark 4: It is well known that L q space is a Banach space for any 1 ≤ q ≤ ∞ [37] . The case of weighted norm under a change of measure has been shown in Fischer-Riesz theorem (Theorem 7.18 of [38] ), which applies to our scenario, i.e., L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 is a Banach space. Details of the proof are omitted.
The operator to be defined below will perform the truncation of any strategies in the space L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 to the set of feasible strategies A, due to the power limitations of the transmission antennas.
Definition 6: Given the set of feasible strategies A ⊂ L 1 (M, R, ν), an operator is defined that performs saturation truncation of the original strategy profile p ∈ L 1 (M, R, ν) such that the truncated strategy profile is within the space of all feasible strategies A. Specifically, we define the operator as T : L 1 (M, R, ν) → A such that for an arbitrary p ∈ L 1 (M, R, ν), we have that the resulting strategy profilep
which satisfiesp(x) = P E (p(x)), ∀x ∈ M . A property of the operator T is given in the lemma below. Lemma 1: The operator T : L 1 (M, R, ν) → L 1 (M, R, ν) is non-expansive, i.e., for two arbitrarily picked elements p (1) , p (2) ∈ L 1 (M, R, ν), there is
Proof: This lemma is a direct extension of the projection theorem in Euclidean space [35] . For any p (1) , p (2) ∈ L 1 (M, R, ν), we can obtain
Moreover, based on Definition 6 as well as the non-expansive property of the projection operator P E as given in the projection theorem (i.e., Proposition 3.2 by Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [35] ), for any fixed x ∈ M , there is
Hence, based on the definition of the weighted L 1 norm, we can directly obtain
which is equivalent to (22) , thus concludes the proof. Now, we establish the existence and uniqueness of meanfield equilibrium in the case of CDMA communication protocol.
Theorem 1: Assume α = 1, there exists a unique meanfield equilibrium p * ∈ A ⊂ L 1 (M, R, ν) when CDMA with single user detection is adopted in the game G, and the utility function of each player is given by (17) .
Proof: See Appendix I. Remark 5: Note that the assumption α = 1 can be interpreted as requiring the length of the signature sequence n s to be greater than the number of users N . In other words, there is some redundancy in the number of sub-carries (i.e., code chips) in the implementation of spread spectrum technique. This assumption is commonly satisfied in the practical implementation of CDMA protocol, as it is often required that n s N to enhance the robustness of orthogonality against time offsets among signal waveforms from different users or to accommodate possible incoming users.
V. NOMA TRANSMISSION POWER GAME
A. Multi-packet reception (MPR) in NOMA 1) Power-domain NOMA and SIC decoding: For powerdomain NOMA, we still adopt the spread-spectrum technique. For convenience and fairness of social welfare comparison between CDMA and NOMA in Part II [1] , the same set of signature sequences {s j } N j=1 is allocated to the users. Hence, the ratio α = N ns between the number N of users and the length n s of a signature sequence still satisfies 0 < α ≤ 1. The main difference between CDMA and NOMA is reflected in the specific decoding algorithm adopted by the receiver. Now, we explicitly give the procedures of SIC decoding algorithm for power-domain NOMA. This requires a proper determination of the decoding order of signals from different sources. Typically, the order of decoding is affected by the realization of the channel gains h i 2 , as indicated in Vaezi et al. [20] and Xia et al. [39] . The outcome of decoding is based on the SINR and is determined by Shannon's theorem as given in (3) . The SINR level of each data source in the received signal is presented below. Consider the decoding order of the signals as a vector v := (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v N ), where each index v j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } is distinct. For conventional SIC schemes, the recursive decoding only continues if and only if all the previous decoding procedures are successful. From the perspective of the signal source v i which is currently being decoded, the set of signal sources which has been successfully decoded and canceled from received waveform
Then, the SINR of each signal source upon the decoding procedure can be expressed as
If the signal from source m i is decoded successfully from the received waveform y[k], i.e., γ (mi) = 1, the SIC decoding will proceed to the one with the largest channel gain h mi+1 2 among remaining signal sources; otherwise, SIC terminates and all the signals from the remaining sources in the received waveform are dropped.
In order to extract information more effectively from the received waveform y[k], an improved version of SIC is proposed by Xia et al. [39] for uplink transmission such that the base station attempts to decode the remaining users' information even when failures happen. In other words, the signal that was not successfully decoded will be treated as interference in the subsequent decoding procedures. In this case, the successful decoding setĨ(v i ) from the perspective of user v i is expressed asĨ
and the decoding procedure terminates after all data sources i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } have been attempted for decoding. We base our analysis on this improved version of SIC [39] . The implementation issues of the SIC decoding algorithm is also of concern. In practice, the base station senses the channel gain of the communication link from each user in advance, and it is relatively static since the users lack mobility. Hence, the base station can determine the decoding order of each user in advance and broadcast the channel gains as well as the decoding order to all potential users during initialization. This fixed decoding order assumption for SIC has also been employed by Wei et al. [40] .
The following remark justifies the mechanisms and incentives for the uplink users to stick to the broadcasted decoding order when they interact with each other as non-cooperative players.
Remark 6: Since the base station has full knowledge of the channel gains of all users, the mean-field equilibrium strategy of the game G can be fully calculated in advance. In order to regulate the users with the broadcasted decoding order, the base station is designed to impose penalties (in terms of delay or refusal of service) when some users are deviating from their equilibrium strategy continuously or intentionally. Therefore, we can safely assume that each player in the game G will adopt the decoding order broadcasted by the base station. Practically, the base station is designed to decode the received signal sources by the specified order as part of the protocol.
2) The utility functions for the mean-field game using SIC:
To determine the utility function of each uplink user, we need to obtain the expression of SINR of each received signal sources at the base station. Due to the recursive nature of SIC, it is necessary to determine the decoding order before giving the expressions of SINR. In this paper, we restrict our consideration to the case where the SIC algorithm at the base station follows the descending order of the squared norm of the channel gain.
For simplicity of analysis, we assume that at each step of SIC, the interference caused by users decoded prior to this step is perfectly canceled regardless of their decoding outcomes, which is similar to the model in Chen et al. [41] . Thus the SINR is approximated by
Remark 7: Though we have assumed that each user enjoy a perfect cancellation of interference from previously decoded users during SIC, this does not hold true in general as the receiving SINR of a portion of users can fail to meet condition (3) for successful decoding. The model we consider here is an approximation, which provides a straightforward characterization of the features of NOMA without introducing much complexity. Fortunately, if there are more general models where the interference faced by each user during SIC can be characterized explicitly, the social welfare comparison in Part II [1] will remain valid as long as equilibrium strategies exist.
Similar to the case of CDMA, when the number of players N → ∞ under NOMA protocol, the SINR of the received signal from player θ i ∈ M is expressed as
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variable θ * following the distribution f (x), and Kolmogorov's strong law of large number holds since by Assumption 1,
The utility function of any user θ i ∈ M under NOMA protocol is
Remark 8: The determination of the interference αE[p(θ * )θ * 1 {θ * <θi} ] faced by each user θ i ∈ M is equivalent to the identification of the decoding order at that specific user, as the interference is the only term in the utility function impacted by the decoding order. According to the strong law of large number, the interference from an infinite number of users will converge almost surely to the term αE[p(θ * )θ * 1 {θ * <θi} ]. Hence, each user θ i ∈ M can recover the actual decoding order with probability 1, as long as the PDF f (θ i ), (θ i ∈ M ) is known.
B. Analysis of the NOMA transmission power equilibrium
Player θ i 's optimal action against opponents' aggregate actions is given by the best response operator (15), i.e., ∀θ i ∈ M , there is
Again, we are going to adopt the Banach fixed point theorem to establish the existence and uniqueness of the mean-field equilibrium strategy p * .
According to Definition 2, a vector space consisting of all strategies with bounded power allocation is defined as
is a Banach space. And the set of feasible strategies A is a subset of L ∞ (M, R, ν). Now, we give the main result concerning the equilibrium strategy for NOMA, which establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 2: Assume α = 1, there exists a unique meanfield equilibrium p * ordered ∈ A ⊂ L ∞ (M, R, ν) when NOMA is adopted in the game G with fixed SIC decoding order following the descending order of the channel gain h i 2 , and the utility function of each player is given by (26) .
Proof: See Appendix II.
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have considered an uplink power control problem for wireless communication when massive users are competing for the channel resources. Both power-domain CDMA and NOMA are investigated, on which the noncooperative channel access model is based. When analyzing the equilibrium behaviors of this non-cooperative channel access problem, a mean-field game (MFG) model is adopted so that the opponents' actions are considered collectively. This reduces the complexity of the information structure in a largescale system, and the analysis of the interactions of a large population of players becomes tractable.
In this part of the paper, the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium strategy are established for CDMA and NOMA, respectively. When NOMA is adopted, the competition among the channel users is moderated by the interference cancellation during decoding process, which can improve the system efficiency naturally, in contrast to the fierce competition under CDMA. The social welfare comparison is evaluated in Part II [1] .
APPENDIX I PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Relying on the best response operator (19) for a single player θ i ∈ M , we can define a "strategy-wise" best response operator BR : L 1 (M, R, ν) → L 1 (M, R, ν) which performs updates to strategy profiles based on the utility function of all players θ i ∈ M . The operator BR is defined such that for any given strategy profile p k ∈ L 1 (M, R, ν), we can obtain a new strategy profile p k+1 through p k+1 := BR(p k ) ∈ L 1 (M, R, ν),
which satisfies
Since in practice, the antennas can only transmit at the power levels within E, we adopt the saturation truncation operator T as defined in Definition 6 so that a new feasible strategy p k+1 is obtained as
The normed space L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 of functions defined on M ⊂ R ++ is complete, hence the existence and uniqueness of mean-field equilibrium in the game G can be given in two steps.
The first step is to show that the composition operator T • BR defined on the space of feasible strategy profiles L 1 (M, R, ν) is a contraction mapping. We pick two arbitrary strategy profiles p Since it is assumed that α = 1, we obtain that α ∈ (0, 1) based on the CDMA protocol. As a result, the composition operator T • BR is a contraction mapping on the Banach space L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 . By Banach fixed point theorem, the operator T •BR has a unique fixed point p * on the space of possible strategies L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 . Moreover, in order to show that the game G admits a feasible mean-field equilibrium, it is still necessary to show that the fixed point p * of the "strategy-wise" best response operator T • BR lies within the space of feasible strategies A, with details given below.
As T • BR is a contraction mapping on the Banach space L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 , a Cauchy sequence {p k } k∈N can be constructed with any given initial element p 0 ∈ L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 such that its limit point will be exactly the unique fixed point p * of T • BR. According to Theorem 1 in Section 2.12 of [37] , if the set of feasible strategies A, as a subset of the Banach space L 1 (M, R, ν), · ν 1 , is closed, the set A is complete. Hence, the limit p * of the constructed Cauchy sequence {p k } k∈N will lie within A. Now, it remains to show that A is closed.
For any q in the closure A of A, there exists a sequence {q k } k≥1 such that q k − q ν 1 → 0 as k → ∞. According to Corollary 2.32 in [42] , this implies the existence of a subsequence {q kj } such that q kj → q, ν-a.e. Hence, the point q ∈ A is E-valued ν-a.e, so q ∈ A. Therefore, the set A is closed.
By the definition of mean-field equilibrium (Definition 4), the existence and uniqueness of mean-field equilibrium in the game G adopting CDMA is shown, which concludes this proof. 
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